There is perhaps no other assessment issue as heated, controversial, and fre quently debated as that of bias in cognitive assessment. (Taylor, 1991, p. 3)
tional setting or job. Jensen (1980) defined predictive validity bias as "systematic error (as contrasted to random errors of measurement) in the prediction of the crite rion variable for persons of different subpopulations as a result of basing prediction on a common regression equation for all persons regardless of their subpopulation memberships..." (p. 380). If estimated true scores are used, a test will be a biased predictor if two or more groups differ significantly in slopes, intercepts, or standard error of estimates of the separate regression lines for those groups. W hen estimated true scores are not used, then the resulting unreliability of test scores (which is in all tests to some degree) will result in differences in regression intercepts (for groups with different mean performance on the predictor). This need not impede the evalu ation of bias as long as separate regression lines are used for predicting the criterion.
After analyzing the available literature up to 1980 , Jensen (1980 arrived at the following conclusions: (a) The large majority of studies did not find differential test validity for the two most researched groups, African Americans and W hites; (b) W hen significant differences in regression parameters were found between African Americans and Whites, the differences were in regression intercepts, with the Afri can American intercept lower than the White one; and (c) This intercept bias results in overprediction of African Americans' criterion performance when predictions are based on a White or common regression line. This outcome would fa v o r the Af rican American group in a "colorblind" selection process, directly contrary to claims by CTBH advocates.
Construct Validity of Tests
Construct validity issues are relevant to a scientific understanding of what underly ing psychological processes tests measure. Whereas investigations of predictive validity use data that are external to the tests (i.e., the criterion), investigations of construct validity evaluate internal psychometric indices. Examples of internal in dices discussed in BIMT include item difficulty levels, item discrimination indices, item score x total score correlations, item characteristic curves (ICCs), reliability coefficients, and results of various factor analytic procedures. Significant differ ences between two or more ethnic groups on any of these indices in isolation or in patterns of correlations among all the units that make up the total score would sug gest that the test behaves differently internally across those groups (Jensen, 1980, p. 429) . Such evidence of construct bias would suggest that the scores may have a dif ferent psychological meaning across groups (Jensen, 1980, p. 533 ).
His analysis of data then available led Jensen (1980, pp. 585-587) to conclude that (a) White, African American, and Mexican American samples show similar in ternal consistency reliabilities and raw test score/chronological age correlations on mental tests; (b) social class and racial group differences in item difficulty are not consistently related to subjective judgem ents of the degree of "culture-loadedness" of mental test items; (c) W hite-A frican American differences are typically slightly larger on nonverbal than on verbal tests; (d) factor analyses of mental test batteries show the same factor structure in White and African American samples; (e) the magnitude of African American-White differences (in standard deviation units) is directly related to the size of a test's g loadings; (f) in tests with heterogeneous item types (e.g., Stanford-Binet and W echsler scales), the rank order of item difficulties across ethnic groups correlates above .95; (g) items that discriminate most between African American and White samples are the same ones that discriminate most be tween older and younger individuals within each ethnic group; and (h) insufficient evidence was available to permit firm conclusions regarding cultural bias in con struct validity with less frequently researched groups, such as non-M exican Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian Americans.
Situational Bias
Jensen (1980) coined the term "situational bias" to describe "influences in the test situation, but independent of the test itself, that may bias test scores" (p. 377). Such factors include characteristics of the examiner (e.g., age, race, or gender), the em o tional atmosphere of the testing situation, the cooperativeness and/or motivation of the examinee, and characteristics of the test instructions. As Jensen indicated, situa tional characteristics are not an attribute of tests themselves and thus are outside the domain of test bias itself. However, were they to affect test scores systematically as a function of ethnicity of examinees, then logically they should significantly mani fest themselves in evaluations of both predictive and construct bias.
Jensen (1980) concluded that no situational aspects of the testing session contrib ute significantly to the test score differences among social class and ethnic groups.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss the effect of BIMT on writing, theory, and research since 1980 emphasizing research in school psychology, which has it self traditionally emphasized cognitive assessment.
FORMAL REVIEWS OF BIMT
Jensen has estimated that at the time Modgil and Modgil (1987) compiled their book, BIMT had received more than 100 published critiques, reviews, and com mentaries. A computerized title search in the SocioFile database back to 1980 using the keywords "Bias in Mental Testing" yielded 52 reviews of BIM T in journals. Twenty-eight of these reviews appeared in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Clarke, 1980) . Two of the 52 citations are to responses by Jensen to reviews of BIMT. In 1984, Reynolds and Brown (1984b) published Perspectives on Bias in M ental Testing, a compilation of nine invited chapters presenting a variety of views from scholars on BIMT specifically and test bias issues generally. Arthur Jensen: Con sensus and Controversy appeared in Modgil and M odgil's series profiling "M as ter-Minds" in psychology in 1987. A sizeable portion of the book is devoted to a critique and discussion of psychological and educational implications of Jensen's writings on test bias.
Owing to BIMT's wide-ranging coverage, the emotionality over its subject matter, and the social importance/implications of its conclusions, reviews of BIMT were var ied. AJthough many reviewers limited their comments to BIMT's actual content, oth ers addressed a variety of tangential issues. The focus of reviews ranged from specific technical disagreements over the use of or rationale for certain mathematical formulas (e.g., see Horn & Goldsmith, 1981) to commentaries on the broader implications. The tone of reviews ranged from ad hominem polemics to balanced (but constructive) criti cism to effusive praise. O f importance, despite the variability in reactions, no reviewer offered empirical evidence that refuted BIMT's main conclusions.
OTHER CONCLUSIONS THAT MENTAL TESTS ARE NOT BIASED
Two years after the publication of BIMT, a panel of 19 experts commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council reviewed the test bias literature and concluded that well-constructed tests did not show evidence of bias against English-speaking minority groups, particularly African Americans (W igdor & Gamer, 1982) . Perhaps the ultimate position paper by experts on intelli gence and intelligence testing is "Mainstream Science on Intelligence" (1994), which was reprinted in the journal Intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997). Fifty-two pro fessionals, all of them well known for their work on intelligence, signed the state ment, reflecting an unusual degree of consensus among a group with varied theoretical views about intelligence. They said:
Intelligence is a very general mental capability that...can be measured, and in telligence tests measure it well. They are among the most accurate (in technical terms, reliable and valid) of all psychological tests and assessments....W hile there are different types of intelligence tests, they all measure the same intelli gence....Intelligence tests are not culturally biased against American blacks or other native-born, English-speaking peoples in the U.S. Rather, IQ scores pre dict equally accurately for all such Americans, regardless of race and social class. ("Mainstream Science on Intelligence," 1994, p. A 17) Owing largely to controversy engendered by Herrnstein and M urray's The Bell Curve (1994) , the American Psychological Association (APA) assembled a Task Force of 11 highly respected psychologists with expertise in intelligence to evalu ate research on intelligence and intelligence testing. Only three members were sig natories to the "Mainstream Science on Intelligence" (1994) statement. About the characteristics of tests, their authoritative report (Neisser et al., 1996, p. 94) states, "none...contributes substantially to the Black/White differential in intelligence test scores," contrary to the CTBH. The consensus, then, among those actually con ducting research on intelligence is that the CTBH is unsubstantiated (see also Reynolds, 1998 Reynolds, , 1999 .
PARTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT TESTS ARE NOT BIASED
Snyderman and Rothman (1988) analyzed 661 surveys from social scientists and educators containing questions related to the "IQ controversy." Four survey ques tions related to various claims about test bias, all of which had been refuted in BIMT. Overall, respondents indicated that most commonly used intelligence tests are somewhat biased against African Americans and low SES groups, particularly regarding conditions that were external to the test (BIM T's situational bias). How ever, the subset of respondents who reported conducting research on, or writing ar ticles about, test bias rated the four claims as less credible (e.g., having less of a biasing effect) than did the remainder of the sample (p. 121).
PROFESSIONALS' CONTINUED CLAIMS THAT TESTS ARE BIASED
In this section, we will concentrate on claims since publication of BIMT that com monly used standardized tests are biased against ethnic subgroups. Although such claims use a variety of terminologies, they largely recycle one or more of the seven categories of the CTBH summarized at the beginning of this article. Indeed, this sec tion is organized in terms of those categories. In a subsequent section, we will address the ways in which these criticisms violate basic principles of scientific inquiry. (1996) If African Americans and other minorities are included in [standardization] samples, their scores will be dispersed throughout the distribution of obtained scores. Minority group scores will not cluster within the distribution in large enough numbers to have any influence on the norms....The largest segment of the population represented in the tryout samples and the standardization sam ple will be the White, middle class. This is the group which will control the greatest influence on item selection and on the norms or the standardization of a norm-referenced test. (p. Ill) Figueroa (1991) argues that since test makers face technical and financial diffi culties in norming ability tests on large samples of bilingual populations, then tests should not be used in educational decision-m aking with such populations (Figueroa, 1991) .
Inappropriate Content

Dent
Exam iners' and Language Bias
Hilliard (1984) evokes the "language bias" argument in criticizing BIMT for not taking into account the work of cultural anthropologists and linguists. If this were done, according to Hilliard, psychometricians would presumably be compelled to admit that "a vocabulary test or vocabulary similarities that are dependent on a common vocabulary meaning should be expected to vary by cultural group" (p. 147). Therefore, test developers cannot assume that items are apprehended or per ceived in the same way by all examinees. Armour- Thomas (1992) , in a selective re view of articles that adopt a sociolinguistic perspective in criticizing test interpretation with different cultural groups, writes, "Testing procedures are stan dardized for purposes of reliability and cannot adjust for differential response bi ases in children that may be a function of their sociolinguistic experiences. But such constraints of the testing environment may preclude an accurate estimation of cog nitive competence from children from culturally different backgrounds" (p. 557).
Inequitable Social Consequences
In responding to BIM T's conclusion that standardized tests of mental ability do not cause, but merely reflect, subgroup differences, Scarr (1981) states:
By addressing so narrowly the scientific issues of test bias, Jensen has avoided an explicit statement of the conclusions that scream out from his pages: that blacks as a group will not succeed educationally and occupationally in this so ciety, and their lack of success can be justified by their poor performance on tests that predict educational and occupational success... [B] y raising the spec ter of racial genetic differences in intelligence and by defining test bias in a nar row, psychometric way, Jensen's book conjures up images of blacks doomed to failure by their own inadequacies, (p. 330, 338) Gould (1995, 1996) explicitly agrees that tests are not biased statistically and do not show differential predictive validity. But he claims that defining cultural bias statistically is confusing because the public is concerned not with bias in a narrow statistical sense, but whether the African American-W hite IQ difference occurs "because society treats blacks unfairly-that is, whether lower black scores record biases in this social sense. And this crucial question (to which we do not know the answer) cannot be addressed by a demonstration that [statistical] bias doesn't ex ist..." (Gould, 1995, p. 18) .
Differential Predictive Validity
Some proponents of the CTBH continue to argue that tests are not valid predictors for ethnic subgroups while at the same time admitting that they do have predictive validity (e.g., Helms, 1992; Hilliard, 1984) , although the specific mechanism through which this supposedly occurs differs from critic to critic. Helms (1992) argues:
Eurocentricism likely is often intrinsic to the criteria or evaluations thereof as well as to the tests themselves. When Eurocentricism mutually characterizes tests and criteria, then significant test-criteria correlations should occur. How ever, the meaning of the correlations may not be that intelligence (as measured by [cognitive ability tests]) is predictive of performance (as variously mea sured). Instead they might merely indicate that a Eurocentric cognitive style is correlated with itself wherever one measures it. (p. 1096) Hilliard (1984) offers a different perspective in criticizing predictive validity methodology:
Existing psychometric predictive validity models fail to describe, control for, or account for intervening variables between IQ testing and measures of achievement. In particular, variations in the quality of instruction and varia tions in relevant life experiences [of minority cultural groups] are totally ig nored...I have discovered no evidence to indicate that the inadequacy in the models for validity study is being examined, (pp. 165-166) Dent (1996) cites data from Mercer (1979) showing that the correlation between the W echsler Intelligence Scale for Children and grade point averages for K -6 stu dents was .46 for W hite students but .20 for African American students. These data are then compared with statistical criteria for establishing predictive validity bias, much of which was echoed in BIMT. On the basis of this one study, Dent concludes "These data clearly indicate that...the W echler Intelligence Scale for Children does not meet the criteria established for test fairness" (p. 113).
Qualitatively Distinct M inority and M ajority Aptitude and Personality
CTBH adherents continue to claim that cognitive processes are subgroup specific and cannot be used validly even on native-born and English-speaking members of ethnic minority groups. For example, Helms (1992) argues that the similarity in test factor structures and correlation matrices across groups occurs because the mea surements reflect little more than "proficiency in W hite culture" (p. 1084). In a sim ilar vein, Richardson (1993) suggests that psychometricians have not settled the issue of whether or not cognitive ability tests measure general intelligence or a "Eu rocentric cognitive style" (p. 565).
The best known presentation of the cognitive-difference version of the CTBH is given by Helms (1992) , who claims that "European-centered" values and beliefs are characterized by "rugged individualism," "action orientation," "status and power," and "competition" (among other things). In contrast, "African-centered" values and beliefs are characterized by "spirituality," "harmony," "movement," "orality," and "social tim e" (among other things). Helms proposes that these differ ent styles influence responses on cognitive ability tests.
PRESENTATIONS OF BIAS TO NONPROFESSIONAL AUDIENCES Popular Media Presentations
An important element of the controversy over BIMT and more recent books, partic ularly The Bell Curve (Hermstein & Murray, 1994) , is vigorous media attention (e.g., Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995) . Media presentations cannot be ignored be cause they influence professionals and lay people alike. Unfortunately, the media may distort issues, provide only partial explanations, and misrepresent or ignore professional views. One reason for the "M ainstream Science on Intelligence" (1994) statement was to counter flawed presentations: " [S]ome conclusions dis missed in the media as discredited are actually firmly supported" (p. A18). One of those media-dismissed conclusions was that tests are unbiased.
Making a case for powerful media influence in his "IQ Testing and the M edia," Hermstein (1982) stated, "A story neglected sometimes damages the truth more than a story mistold..." (p. 70). Media frequently exert influence by initially choos ing submissions that are critical of IQ/mental testing, making these issues contro versial, and then ignoring contradictory evidence (the empirical base) or rebuttal (by experts in testing). Hermstein (1982) chronicled his numerous dealings with media in which they both distorted his and others' views and then refused to allow them to respond to those attacks.
M edia coverage of test bias, intelligence tests, and even intelligence in general is often inaccurate and itself biased. A "W orld News Tonight" segment on November 22nd, 1994 reflects the extent to which media slant presentation of views (see Gordon, 1997 , for a detailed analysis). In the space of a few minutes, the segment attacked standard IQ tests as narrow relative to "current knowledge" (i.e., G ardner's theory of multiple intelligences; see Jensen, 1998, pp. 128-132 for a cri tique), as well as researchers whose work has been supported by the Pioneer Fund (an agency which funds research on racial differences). The ABC reporter then tied the Pioneer Fund to the American Eugenics Society and to Nazi death camps. The wholly unwarranted implication was, of course, that research funded by the Pioneer Fund must be tainted with eugenicist views.
Textbook Presentation of Test Bias
In an analysis of a small, but we trust not biased, sample of recent popular intro ductory and developm ental psychology textbooks, Brown and Barbour (1999) found that of the 27 that discuss bias, 67% state that tests are biased, 11 % were un certain, and only 22% state that tests are not biased. Kalat (1999), Lefton (1997) , and W eiten (1997) have particularly accurate presentations. After describing the predictive validity of tests and lower school performance of African Americans, Kalat (1999, p. 234) states, "In short, the tests show no evidence of ethnic-group bias, so continued claims of test bias could be described as blaming the messenger (the IQ tests) for the bad news." O f those claiming bias, most do not even mention differential predictive validity as a criterion for bias, but only present individual items as putatively biased. Twenty-two percent present the item, "W hat is the thing to do if a boy/girl much sm aller than yourself starts to fight with you?" as bi ased although evidence cited above indicates that it is not. Eleven percent present items from the Black Intelligence Test of Cultural Homogeneity (BITCH), with no mention of its lack of validity. Many of the texts cite Helms (1992) in support o f the conclusion that tests are biased, even though she offers no empirical support for her claims. Given the position of researchers that tests are not biased, Plotnik's (1996) position is particularly puzzling: "Researchers adm it that IQ tests are cul turally biased because they assess accum ulated knowledge, which depends on en vironm ental opportunities available in a particular culture or group" (p. 267). Plotnik cites Humphreys (1992) . But Humphreys (1992) explicitly denied that tests are biased, leaving one to wonder on what Plotnik's statement actually was based.
BIAS RESEARCH IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY JOURNALS SINCE BIMT
Since the publication of BIMT, studies evaluating various tests for bias have ap peared frequently in the psychology literature. Since this paper focuses on test bias as it relates to school psychology, we have limited our review here to the school psychology literature.
Predictive Validity
At the tim e BIM T was published, the W echsler In tellig en ce Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) was the latest edition in use. Using W ISC-R Verbal IQs to predict Wide Range Achievement Test Reading subtest scores of middle versus low SES emotionally disturbed, learning-disabled, and educable mentally retarded 7-to 22-year-olds, Hale, Raymond, and Gajar (1982) found no evidence of differential predictive validity. Using W ISC-R Full Scale IQs of large samples of middle and lower SES White, African American, and Mexican American first through eighth graders, Oakland (1983) found little evidence of biased prediction of California Achievement Test Reading and Math scores; validity coefficients among the three ethnic groups and two social classes were similar. Poteat, Wuensch, and Gregg (1988) (Emerling, 1990) ; (e) a kindergarten screening battery as predictor of Stanford Achievement Test (SAT) total battery scores in large samples of Native American and White students in kindergarten, first, third, and fourth grades. Use of common regression lines underpredicted W hites' scores and overpredicted Native Am ericans' scores (Stone & Gridley, 1991) ; (f) Differential Abilities Scales (DAS) ability subtest scores as predictors of DAS basic number skills achievement scores in samples of Asian American and W hite children. Systematic errors in prediction increased with ability level. Use of a common regression line led to overprediction of the W hite group's scores and underprediction of the Asian Americans' scores (Stone, 1992) .
Content Validity of Individual Items
Analysis of individual items continues to be a popular method for investigating bias in the internal characteristics of mental tests. Mishra (1982) used the likelihood ra tio chi-square statistic to investigate item bias in 79 items from the Information, Similarities, and Vocabulary subtests of the W ISC-R for White and Native Ameri can fourth and fifth graders. Fifteen of the 79 items were biased against the Navajo participants. Comparing the rank order of difficulty on items on the Boehm Test of Basic Concepts standardization data for children of different socioeconomic levels, Silverstein, Belger, and M orita (1982) found no evidence of internal bias. Children mastered basic concepts in the same temporal order while differing only in the rate of m astery. In an evaluation of item bias in the M cCarthy Scales of Children's Abil ities in samples of White and Mexican American 5-8-year-old children, Murray and Mishra (1983) concluded that only three verbal items were biased.
Evaluation of item difficulty patterns in the Verbal subtests o f the W ISC-R for White, African American, Hispanic, and Bermudian 7 -1 0-year-old children identi fied a small number of items as differentially difficult for particular groups, but the item difficulty curves for all groups were rem arkably parallel (Sandoval, Zimmerman, & Woo-Sam, 1983) . Koh, Abbatiello, and M cloughlin (1984) ana lyzed responses from 360 test protocols of Chicago school children to examine content bias in seven WISC items singled out by Judge J. F. Grady in his opinion in the PASE (Parents in Action in Special Education) case as being culturally biased against African American children. No significant differences were found in the percentage of students passing the items for W hites and African Americans, and er ror analyses showed no significant "cultural" differences between W hite and Afri can American participants. Pugh and Boer (1989) examined 10 questions with culturally specific content from the W echsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) Information subtest in a sample of 95 17-64-year-old Canadian partici pants. Rank order and chi-square analyses showed that accuracy scores (p values) for these questions differed significantly from those of the WAIS-R normative sample for the majority of the items.
Analyzing data from the entire standardization sample of the Peabody Picture V ocab u lary T est-R evised (PPV T -R ) using race, item , and total score intercorrelations for each item on Forms L and M, Reynolds, W illson, and Chatman (1984) found few instances of bias. Argulewicz and Abel (1984) , exam ining item bias on PPVT-R Forms L and M for samples o f W hite and M exican American children in Grades 1-4, found evidence of bias in occasional items. However, the lack o f a discernible pattern in biased items coupled with high reli ability indices in both groups suggests that PPVT-R content bias is minimal.
Using a linguistic analysis to analyze error responses, Anderson and M orris (1989) found no evidence of internal bias on the W oodcock Language Profi ciency Battery in a sample of 12-14-year-old rural learning-disabled and nor mally achieving students. W illson, Nolan, Reynolds, and Kamphaus (1989), using a partial correlation technique to detect differential item functioning in items from the K-ABC, found that 23 items were biased against African A m eri cans and 13 items were biased against W hites. The authors concluded, however, that elim ination o f these items would have little effect on race differences in mean total scores. Comparisons of item-group partial correlations on the K-ABC M en tal Processing and Achievem ent scales for English-speaking M exican American and W hite fifth and sixth graders revealed that 17 out of 120 items of the Mental Processing Scales showed evidence of bias, mostly against Mexican Americans, whereas 58 out of 92 Achievem ent scale items showed bias against Mexican Americans (Valencia, Rankin, & Livingston, 1996) .
Construct Validity
The W ide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) met minimum requirements of inter nal consistency reliability for a large sample of M exican American fourth and fifth graders (Mishra, 1981a) . Internal consistency reliability estimates for the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) were high for both W hite and Mexican American third grade males from low SES backgrounds, indicating no internal con sistency bias (Valencia, 1984) .
Factor analytic methods are also frequently used to assess the equivalence of constructs measured in two or more groups on the same test. Factor analysis of scores for Whites and M exican American 5-7-year-old children on 18 tests-of the McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilities yielded similar factors with both groups and no evidence of construct bias (Mishra, 1981b) . Tests for factorial equivalence o f scores on 10 subscales of the WISC-R for large samples of middle and low SES children indicated that the subscales measured equivalent constructs in the two groups (Hale, 1983) . Reynolds and Piersel (1983) examined the cross-group facto rial congruence of the Boehm Test of Basic Concepts (BTBC) Forms A and B across W hite and Mexican American children and found no significant construct bias. Using a multi-sample confirmatory factor analysis approach to detect con struct bias in the K-ABC for large samples of White and African American 7-12-year-olds, Keith, Fugate, DeGraff, Diamond, Shadrach, and Stevens (1995) found no differences in 7-8-year-old children and small differences, apparently caused by measurement error, in 9 -12-year-old children.
Situational and M iscellaneous Sources o f Bias
M ishra (1980) analyzed data from the administration of two W ISC verbal subtests and the Raven Progressive M atrices by two White and two Mexican American ex aminers on American and M exican American third graders. Participants' perfor mance was unaffected by exam iners' ethnicity on two of the three tests, but Mexican American children scored significantly higher when the third test was ad ministered by M exican American examiners. M ishra (1983) gave 36 Stanford-Binet protocols of 5-8-year-old participants to four groups of examiners for scoring, but varied the amount of information about the participants' ethnicity and IQ. No bias in the process of scoring was found. W e remind the reader that situa tional bias, if found, is independent of the test itself.
Some studies would have had potential implications for indirectly testing the "standardization fallacy" (Jensen, 1980), if they did not have serious methodologi cal problems. For example, Oplesch and Genshaft (1981) compared 20 bilingual Puerto Rican first through third graders' scores on the WISC-R with scores on a Spanish language version of the WISC (Escala de Inteligencia W echsler Para Ninos). The researchers found no significant differences between the Full Scale IQs across the two tests. Unfortunately, conclusions from this study are limited by a small sample size and a confounding of test translation with form of the test used (WISC versus WISC-R). Sharpley and Stone (1985) administered the PPVT-R Forms L and M (normed on Americans) to 410 nonreferred Australian children. Al though the Australian sample generally scored lower, no significant differences oc curred in mean raw scores in age cohorts across the American standardization sample and the Australian sample. Unfortunately, the authors did not conduct any predictive or item bias analyses across the two samples.
Too few studies of situational and similar sources of bias have appeared in school psychology journals to permit firm conclusions. For a more extended dis cussion of issues related to cultural minorities and the testing session, see Frisby (1999a, this issue).
Summary of Research Since BIMT
The large number of predictive validity studies from school psychology journals shows little evidence of any bias and no evidence of flagrant bias against American, English-speaking minority groups. W hen prcdictive bias is found, it typically in volves intercept differences, which are to be expected with tests of less than perfect reliability. In many such cases, use of a common regression line results in overprediction of the lower scoring group and underprediction of the higher scor ing group, confirming BIM T's conclusion.
Construct validity studies at the item level or of the entire test through factor anal ysis yield the following conclusions: (a) bias is occasionally found in certain items; (b) items often judged by "armchair" observation (face validity) to be biased prove to be unbiased when subjected to empirical analysis (e.g., Jensen & McGurk, 1987; Sandoval & Miille, 1980) ; (c) in most tests, more items show no evidence of bias than show evidence of bias; (d) observed item bias is often unsystematic, such that patterns in item content or specific groups of examinees penalized cannot be dis cerned; (e) observed item bias is too small to explain the size of group differences in mean total scores; and (f) factor analytic methods reveal factor equivalence across groups and thus no construct bias. For more detailed discussions o f statistical prob lems in item bias research and other bias studies, see Camilli and Shepard (1987, 1994) and Reynolds, Lowe, and Saenz (1999).
EMPIRICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TEST BIAS SINCE BIMT
In 1980, the year of publication of BIMT, over 180 researchers, test developers, and test users were invited to attend the Third Annual Johns Hopkins University Na tional Symposium on Educational Research, held in November. The purpose of the symposium was to synthesize research, propose new guidelines for practice, and identify new research problems related to the topic of test bias. Contributions from 17 distinguished presenters at the symposium were published in the Handbook o f Methods fo r Detecting Test Bias (Berk, 1982) , which describes methods employed by contemporary test publishers to remove bias from achievement, aptitude, and in telligence tests used in public schools, college admissions, and professional certifi cation examination contexts.
Item Bias Detection
According to Jensen (1987) , space limitations prevented inclusion in BIMT of a more detailed discussion of Item Response Theory (IRT)-based methods for de tecting item bias. IRT methods overcome several shortcomings of item analysis methods based on classical test theory (e.g., Hambleton & Swaminathan, 1985) . Based on IRT, the analysis of item characteristic curves (ICC) has become the most frequently used method for detecting item bias in very large samples. An ICC is a monotonically increasing function that describes the relationship between an in crease in the probability of a correct response on an item and an increase in the trait that underlies item performance (Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991) . Ac cording to Osterlind (1989) , ICCs for two or more groups on the same item are equated, then plotted together as a function of item difficulty (probability of suc cess) and examinee ability. Good ICCs resemble the "S" shaped ogive of the nor mal distribution, whereas poor items depart from this shape. An item is unbiased if the probability of success on the item is the same for equally able examinees regard less of their group membership (Osterlind, 1989) . When the same ICCs for two or more groups are superimposed and do not overlap completely, the area between the equated ICCs indicates the degree of bias present in the item. According to Osterlind (1989) , IRT procedures involve complex statistics, require sophisticated computer programs, and work best with very large sample sizes from each subpopulation in order to produce stable item parameter estimates. Unfortunately, obtaining large samples is difficult with some subgroups. For these reasons, this family of methods is used mainly by test development companies that have access to sufficient computer resources and sample sizes. The result is that major contem porary mental tests show no bias against American-born, English-speaking sub groups. A recent presentation of modem methods for detecting item bias can be found in Camilli and Shepard (1994) .
Consequential Validity
Cole and Moss (1989), reflecting a position that expands the concept of test bias be yond its purely statistical/technical meaning as detailed in BIMT, discuss "ex tra-validity" issues, defined as "the purposes for which a test is used, the extent to which those purposes are accomplished by the actions taken, the various side ef fects or unintended consequences, and possible alternatives to the test that might serve the same purpose" (p. 213).
In particular, Messick (1989 Messick ( ,1996 argues that the traditional conception o f con tent, criterion, and construct validity is incomplete and should be expanded to in corporate extra-validity concerns such as consequential validity. Consequential validity would include politics, values, and culture in considering the full context of test interpretation and test use (see Reckase, 1998 , for an example).
However, issues of consequential validity largely relate to the fairness of the ap plication of tests. Including them as an aspect of overall test validity would be retro gressive, reintegrating considerations of fairness with those of test bias. An important contribution of BIMT, which test critics ignore, is its distinction between bias and fairness. W riters continue to add new meanings to the concept of test bias. Although the APA Task Force Report on Intelligence (Neisser et al., 1996) states that cognitive tests show no predictive bias in the statistical sense, they nevertheless charge tests with "outcome bias" because of differential consequences for different groups. Reschly (1997) explicitly conjoins bias and unfairness: "Assessment that does not result in effective interventions...may be biased or unfair...if children and youth with minority characteristics are differentially exposed to ineffective pro grams as a result of assessment activities" (p. 438).
Although consequential validity continues to be studied (Reynolds, in press), Lees-Haley (1996) severely criticizes it as degrading the more objective features of measurement that form the foundation of science.
Cross-Cultural Test Bias
Although BIMT included a chapter on "culture-reduced" tests, the chapter did not discuss in detail bias issues related to American test translations in different coun tries, the testing of non-English or limited-English speakers, or test interpretation in cross cultural (cross-country) comparisons. Van de Vijver and Poortinga (1994, 1997) argue that psychometric analyses of item bias should be supplemented with cross-cultural analyses of bias in two additional areas: "construct bias" and "method bias." According to these authors, construct bias occurs when "test au thors from various societies use definitions of the concept under study that do not fully overlap" (van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1997, p. 30) . M ethod bias occurs "when a cultural factor that is not relevant to the construct studied affects most or all items of a test in a differential way across the cultures studied" (p. 30). Such biases can oc cur when groups from different countries are tested under different testing condi tions or are differentially familiar with response procedures. Since these concerns are outside bias within a given overall culture, they are not discussed here in detail. More detailed treatments are in Bracken and Barona (1991), Frisby (1999b, this is sue), G eisinger (1994), H am ayan and D am ico (1991), H am bleton (1993), Hambleton and Bollwark (1991) , Irvine and Berry (1988), and Lam (1993) .
WHERE D O WE GO FROM HERE? TEST BIAS AND PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
Given the overall current state of research and theory on bias and methodology for test construction and evaluation, we argue that contemporary defenders of the CTBH as an explanation for mean score differences on mental tests between Amer ican-born, English-speaking subgroups have not adhered to rudimentary principles of science. Below we present these principles, and the manner in which they have been violated. 1. Scientific terms should be operationally defined in order to promote clarity in discussion, debate, and problem solving. Consensus in conceptual definition is not needed in order to study a phenomenon. After all, researchers continue to study in telligence despite a lack of agreement over common definition of what it is (e.g., Sternberg & Detterman, 1986) . But operational definitions of the manipulation or measurement of a concept are necessary. Operationally, a biased test is one that yields differential predictive validity. Many defenders of the CTBH appear to use an implicit definition: A biased test is one that yields subgroup differences. The first definition is in keeping with the everyday meaning of bias: "a particular ten dency or inclination, esp. one which prevents unprejudiced consideration o f a ques tion" (Barnhart, 1951) , whereas the second prejudges tests as biased if they show group differences. Rosenbach and M owder (1981) observe that any clinician with a hunch that poorly performing test takers can do better on tests can accuse tests of bias from a "clinical" or "intuitive" perspective. Entire texts have been written with this im plicit definition of bias in mind (e.g., Armour-Thomas & Gopaul-McNicol, 1998) . Helms (1992) concedes that cognitive tests show no bias from a purely statistical perspective, yet accuses tests of bias from a "culturalist" perspective, presumably because they have not demonstrated "cultural," "functional," or "linguistic" equiv alence across groups, concepts which she fails to operationalize.
BIMT should have convinced professionals that a group difference in test scores is not an acceptable operational definition of test bias. The reason is clear, since a group difference definition could conceivably allow someone to accuse reading comprehension tests of being biased against illiterates (Cameron, 1988) . Unfortu nately, Jensen's attempt has not been particularly successful, as seen in several places in this article.
BIM T should also have convinced scientists and other professionals that bias cannot be identified from "armchair" face validity analysis of items (e.g., see Jensen & McGurk, 1987; Sandoval & Miille, 1980) . However, professional educa tors sometimes reveal their own confusion. Consider a recent televised interview (October 14, 1997) in Austin, Texas: A reporter asked a ranking Texas Education Agency (TEA) testing official to comment on a recent lawsuit alleging that the TEA competency test, which must be passed to receive a high school diploma, is biased against minorities. The allegations themselves were based on mean subgroup dif ferences. The official replied, essentially, that the test could not be biased because members of minority groups read test items prior to their use and identified biased ones, which were then deleted.
Understandably, charges that a test is biased are interpreted generally as meaning that the test is bad. Therefore, any test critic can use his or her own definition of bias to try to convince the lay public that something is wrong with a test.
Lack of operational definition of scientific terms has the unfortunate conse quence of leading test defenders and critics to argue past each other instead of with each other. Furthermore, violation of this scientific principle may lead to violations of other scientific principles.
2. Theories should be consistent with the data they are intended to explain. Many defenders of the CTBH propose hypotheses and theories that simply are not con gruent with extant empirical data. Thus, Helms (1992) writes as if a homogeneous "W hite" or "Eurocentric" culture explains group psychological differences, under lies the orientation of test developers, and saturates item content on mental tests. But evidence indicates that Whites are not homogeneous culturally or ethnically, and that mean IQ differences can be found among "W hite" subgroups (see Eysenck, 1984) . Armour-Thomas's (1992) claim that some "cultural" groups have greater social opportunities or experiential advantages over other groups presum ably explains group differences in test scores and implies that standardized cogni tive tests are invalid when used with diverse populations. But the mean mental test scores of low SES Whites exceeds that of high SES African Americans (Coleman et al., 1966; Scarr-Salapatek, 1971; Shuey, 1966) and African A m erican-W hite IQ differences stabilize at one standard deviation even at the highest SES levels (Hermstein & Murray, 1994) .
Perhaps most importantly, reliable evidence of equivalent predictive validity and higher mental test scores by Asian Americans (e.g., Reynolds et al., 1999) di rectly contradicts the CTBH. Francis B acon's "crucial experim ent" (e.g., Brown & Reynolds, 1984) , which tests contradictory predictions from two theories, is a strong method for deciding between two theories. The psychom etric position, that mental tests measure "g" equally for all subgroups, and the CTBH make op posing predictions. Much data, including evidence that subgroups differ most on abstract tests such as Raven's progressive m atrices and digits backward (e.g., Gordon, 1984; Jensen, 1980 Jensen, , 1984b , clearly support "g" theory and contradict the CTBH.
3. A scientific theory should yield clear testable predictions. One contribution of BIMT was its specification of empirical tests of the CTBH. If mental tests are bi ased against a particular group, then the following predictions should be confirmed: (a) items would show a different rank order of item difficulties for different groups; (b) item-total score correlations would differ significantly among groups; (c) item x group interaction terms in ANOVA designs would achieve statistical signifi cance; (d) ICCs for different groups would show different curves; and generally (e) tests should show differential predictive validity for different groups. Given that these results do not occur, the CTBH has effectively been disconfirmed.
In contrast, the hallmark of the CTBH (Helms, 1992; Hilliard, 1984) is attribu tion of group differences to a vague "cultural" variable that, however real to test critics, is so elusive that it has managed to escape detection by any method that can be devised by modern psychom etrics. H elm s's (1992) suggestion that the psychometric methods are themselves biased renders the hypothesis wholly untestable because she can account for any research result, whatever it is. The CTBH is characterized by an absence of specific predictions related to test data, sta tistical methods that would test these predictions, or any objective criteria that would enable its scientific evaluation.
4. Science accepts the principle o f parsimony (O ckham 's razor) . Science accepts the principle that, other things being equal, the simplest explanation is the best. The simplest scientific explanation of an event is that it owes to chance, and unless evi dence indicates otherwise, science does not reject that null hypothesis. Given the claim that tests are biased, the null hypothesis is that they are not biased. That hy pothesis should be rejected only on the basis of contradictory empirical evidence.
Any argument of test bias logically reduces to one that test scores should underpredict minority group members' "real" abilities. Therefore, all bias in tests must ultimately manifest itself as differential predictive validity reflected in signif icantly lower accuracy of prediction for minority groups relative to the majority. But overwhelming evidence supports the null hypothesis that tests do not have dif ferential predictive validity.
5. Critical and supportive evidence should be empirical and relevant. The essen tial task o f CTBH defenders is to present relevant evidence that refutes the conclu sion fro m B IM T and subsequent research that mental tests have equivalent predictive validity fo r different groups. In order to accomplish this, critics must demonstrate that tests show systematic error when administered to different groups, and that such error operates to the detriment of minority groups.
W hether or not test defenders fail to offer "remedies" for racial differences (Scarr, 1981) , fail to respect research by cultural linguists and anthropologists (Hilliard, 1984) , fail to address societal concern over racial discrimination in gener al in dealing with test bias (Gould, 1995 (Gould, ,1996 , use massive empirical data to cover historic prejudice and racism (Richardson, 1995) , fail to recognize that subgroups have different cognitive/linguistic processes (Figueroa, 1991; Helms, 1992) , do not address special education programs that are inadequate (Reschly, 1997) , or fail to include more African Americans in test standardization samples (Dent, 1996) may be interesting issues, but ultimately are irrelevant to scientific evaluation o f test bias. Much of the emotionalism in debates on test bias can be attributed to such ir relevant arguments by CTBH defenders.
6. A scientific theory should be congruent with other theories and data. The CTBH is ultimately rooted in the "specificity doctrine" (Jensen, 1984b) : mental abilities comprise "a repertoire of specific items of [learned] skills and knowledge" and are measured by mental tests that "measure nothing other than some selected sample of the total repertoire of knowledge and skills deemed important by the test constructor" (p. 94).
A rival hypothesis to the specificity doctrine is "g" theory, first articulated by Spearman (1927) , and researched extensively by contemporary psychologists. It accounts for the relative size of W hite-A frican American mean differences across groups of diverse tests in terms of each test's g loading, with larger mean differ ences occurring with tests with larger# loading. Much empirical data supports this explanation.
Even if the CTBH acceptably accounted for data on group differences in mental test performance, which it does not, it would fail on the grounds of lack of fit with other data on intelligence. That is, it exists in isolation from other data, whereas g theory accounts for a massive amount of the literature on measured intelligence (see Jensen, 1998). 7. N either theories nor evidence should be evaluated on the basis o f popularity or consistency with particular sociopolitical positions. Political and social attitudes range from the "far left" to the "far right" (Kerlinger, 1984b) . A legitimate question to ask is whether scientific research influences, or is influenced by, shifting politi cal/popular social ideologies in which it is imbedded (Jensen, 1984c) . For example, Reynolds and Brown (1984a) review particularly odious manifestations of "scien tific racism" in early writing on group differences and human measurement. The point of their review is to help readers understand reasons for objections to testing that persist in modem times. In particular, many African American professionals exhibit hostility toward testing (Gordon, 1987) . Regardless of emotional reactions, conclusions that tests are unbiased should be evaluated with respect to whether or not they withstand empirical scrutiny, and not according to the popularity of their message.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY
As school psychologists are frequent users of standardized mental tests, they should rightly be concerned about the tests' psychometric properties, including the obviously important issue of bias. A major message of this paper is that the over whelming body of research confirms the equivalent validity of those tests with cul turally diverse groups. Thus, school psychologists should be confident in the tests' value. O f course, the tests have limitations; their predictive validity is hardly per fect, and they doubtless do not adequately measure the abilities of some individual examinees, for example.
Given tests' limitations, school psychologists may also rightly consider the use of other assessment procedures. Alternative methods have some advantages over "traditional" cognitive tests (Shinn, 1998) . As such, they can be useful supplements to accepted standard practice. Unfortunately, some professionals propose that school psychologists abandon standardized instruments with good psychometric properties in favor of assessment procedures that either are based on intelligence theories with no long history of research (e.g., Armour-Thomas, 1992) or have little or unknown psychometric bases (e.g., Armour-Thomas & Gopaul-McNicol, 1998; M ercer & Lewis, 1978) . Suzuki, Meller, and Ponterotto (1996, p. 680) state that, "the continued development of alternative measures and procedures will facilitate movement of the profession toward more culturally-sensitive assessment prac tices." However, the impetus to move the practice of school psychology toward al ternative methods for minority groups rests largely on the unfounded belief that current standardized tests are biased. Little research is available on possible bias in the proposed alternative assess ment measures, suggesting that their use is premature at best and perhaps contrary to best practice. Methods such as performance-based assessment are generally less reliable and valid than standardized tests (e.g., Rotberg, 1995) . Since reliability of assessment procedures is negatively correlated with bias (i.e, the lower the reliabil ity, the greater the likelihood of bias; see Linn & Werts, 1971) , performance-based assessment instruments are likely to be biased to some extent (see Braden, 1999, this issue) . Professional organizations, including the NASP (1993), have issued cautions regarding performance-based instruments because of their limited empiri cal base (see Braden, 1999, this issue) .
As Jensen (1980) cautioned, "Claim s o f test bias and o f the unfair use o f tests cannot be ignored by psychologists. Such claim s m ust be objectively investi gated with all o f the available techniques o f psychom etrics and statistical analy sis" (p. ix). Jensen then states explicitly that where bias is found, the test either should not be used on the subgroups for which it is biased or should be revised so as to elim inate the bias. But he goes on to say: "Before the use o f tests is rejected outright, however, one m ust consider the alternatives to testing-w hether deci sions based on less objective m eans o f evaluation (usually educational creden tials, letters o f recom m endation, interview s, and biographical inventories) would guarantee less bias and greater fairness for m inorities than would result from the use of tests" (p. ix). M ore recently, others have adopted the same posi tion (e.g., D aniel, 1997).
W hen tempted to abandon standardized tests, school psychologists should first ensure that alternatives have equivalent psychometric properties. Furthermore, as numerous authors have indicated, those who urge that use of mental tests be abol ished have the responsibility to present equally reliable and valid alternative meth ods of assessment. Unfortunately, as Suzuki and Valencia (1997) warned, research on test bias is decreasing at a time when it should be expanded to cover other sub groups and assessment techniques.
CONCLUSIONS
The major conclusion of this article can be stated confidently: Em pirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that w ell-developed, currently-used mental tests are of equivalent predictive validity for American-born, Eng lish-speaking individuals regardless of their subgroup membership. Individual items in new tests are now routinely evaluated for bias in the developm ent stage. Test developers use empirical approaches to detect differential item functioning across nominal groupings (typically by ethnicity and by gender) of examinees. Item -resp o n se theory (e.g., H am bleton, Sw am inathan, & R ogers, 1991; O sterlind, 1989 ) is consistently applied in test developm ent, as in com puter-adapted tests, and virtually ensures that items are not biased. The presence of biased items is quite unusual in modern tests (Reynolds et al., 1999) . Increas ingly, test developers are advertising their tests as unbiased for ethnicity, race, or gender. Since test companies have access to large and representative samples, any apparent item bias that is discovered in a subsequent research study typically owes to the study's small and unrepresentative sample. Although early intelli gence instrum ents had a variety of psychometric limitations, current frequently used mental tests are perhaps the most carefully constructed, standardized, and evaluated of all psychological tests. In many ways, they serve as models to guide practice in other areas of test development.
Although she was addressing group differences in IQ rather than test bias specifically, we agree with Gottfredson's (1994) call for scientific integrity:
All that is required is for scientists to act like scientists-to demand, clearly and consistently, respect for truth and for free inquiry in their own settings, and to re sist the temptation to win easy approval by endorsing a comfortable lie. (p. 59)
To suggest that science operates separately and distinctly from society and its politics is naive. The controversies surrounding nuclear power, germ warfare, clon ing, and fetal tissue implants attest to the fact that science does not take place in a vacuum and therefore should not be exempt from scrutiny by society at large. We need to recognize that the products of science (as conceived by scientists and re ceived by the general public) are subject to moral, ethical, and personal examina tion. How a particular scientist interprets data is subject to many of these same factors. As an affected party, society must take part in decisions about the applica tion of scientific knowledge in terms of desired outcomes.
However, society can appropriately influence policy and decision-making only to the extent that it is accurately inform ed about scientific evidence. Before sci ence has had the opportunity to provide technical information to the public in an understandable form, however, m isinform ation pertaining to test bias has often been presented by numerous sources, many of which are themselves biased. Be cause of the powerful influence of the media and the extent of existing m isunder standing, scientists and practitioners both should consider their responsibility to provide relevant information (based on sound scientific practice) to their own profession, their students, and the general public. Professionals in school psy chology, individually and collectively, need to present the methodological issues and empirical evidence on socially relevant issues such as bias in mental testing in an informed and objective manner. Having done this, practice should follow sound empirical knowledge. Little is of greater value to a professional than a strong heuristic with clear empirical support.
We agree with Frisby's concern about indiscriminate talk, expressed in the in troduction to this series of articles. The truism that everyone is entitled to his or her opinion is matched by the truism that not all opinions are equal. In science, certainly not all opinions are equal, and peer review should weed out those opin ions that are em pirically unjustified or logically inconsistent. But as citations con tained in this article indicate, the weeds are endangering the orderly garden. Publication in highly regarded professional journals of articles whose claims are contradicted by em pirical evidence undermines the credibility of both our jo u r nals and psychology's very claim to be scientific. Can we expect others to take us seriously when we do not take each other seriously? If, as Hull (1988) has argued persuasively, science operates much as does evolution, in the long run, only the better data and theories will survive. However, waiting for the evolutionary pro cess to work is a painfully slow process. In the short run, a version of G resham 's Law (bad money drives out good) may operate: Bad ideas repeated often enough and loudly enough by those with "nam es" may, through tenacity and authority, drive out good ideas. Test validity is controversial perhaps only because of its im pact on social decision making. But sociopolitical expediency is a poor justifica tion for unsupportable ideas. Bias in belief may be more damaging ultimately than bias in mental testing.
